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Derivatives Safe Harbors in Bankruptcy  
and Dodd-Frank: A Structural Analysis 
By Stephen D. Adams 
Abstract 
The Bankruptcy Code exempts financial derivatives and 
repurchase agreements from key provisions, such as the automatic stay.  
The primary rationale for this special treatment has been the fear that the 
failure of an important market participant could cascade if counterparties 
could not immediately exit their contracts.  Reflecting on the recent 
financial crisis and the Lehman bankruptcy, some scholars have 
suggested that exempting these financial contracts from bankruptcy may 
have exacerbated other kinds of systemic risk and contributed to the 
decision to bail out systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
instead of allowing them to enter bankruptcy.  Congress attempted to 
address this flaw by enacting a Bankruptcy alternative, Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, instead of addressing the problems in the Bankruptcy 
Code safe harbors that were the source of the systemic risk. This article 
demonstrates that the view that Title II replaces bankruptcy reform is 
mistaken.  Title II actually increases both the need and opportunity to 
reassess the proper limits of the safe harbors. 
Without bankruptcy reform, the threat of irreversible damage if 
the SIFI files bankruptcy before intervention may force Title II to 
compete with bankruptcy in order to reach potential SIFIs first.  
However, the difficulty in evaluating whether some firm failures involve 
systemic risk incentivizes Title II decisionmakers to intervene in cases of 
doubt, leading to over-intervention, strain on resources and damage to 
Bankruptcy’s role as the default failure system.  In addition, uncertainty 
over whether Title II will intervene will lead large firms to delay filing 
bankruptcy far past where resolution is optimal.  However, with 
Bankruptcy reform, the Bankruptcy system would complement and 
mitigate weaknesses in the Title II safety net.  In addition, Title II 
removes the primary justification for the safe harbors for financial 
derivatives and repurchase agreements, the fear of the consequences of 
the bankruptcy of a SIFI.  In its wake, the safe harbors for derivative and 
repo creditors are at odds with powerful fairness and efficiency rationales 
behind default bankruptcy rules.   Dodd-Frank may make Bankruptcy 
reform easier to achieve and more urgent. 
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Derivatives Safe Harbors in Bankruptcy and Dodd-
Frank: A Structural Analysis 
By Stephen D. Adams
1 
I. INTRODUCTION   
The relationship between the derivatives exemptions from 
bankruptcy (called safe harbors in the trade) and systemic risk has 
received great attention recently.
2  The architects of the Dodd-Frank Act 
added a new twist to the discussion by enacting a bankruptcy alternative, 
the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), aimed at reducing systemic 
risk independent of the bankruptcy code.
3  How this important provision 
of the Dodd-Frank Act changes the fundamental outlines of the debate 
over the derivative safe harbors has not yet been examined.
4  The central 
argument for the special treatment of derivatives and repos in bankruptcy 
is that to subject them to the normal bankruptcy rules could enhance 
systemic risk if it delayed major financial counterparties from liquidating 
large positions during a liquidity crisis.  The OLA was designed, and has 
the capability, to resolve a systemically risky situation by snatching a 
Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) out of bankruptcy and 
resolving it under special, accelerated rules.  But if the reason for the safe 
harbors has been diminished, why should the bankruptcy code not return 
to its basic principles of protecting the common pool and safeguarding 
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1 Stephen Adams is the Research Director of the Harvard Bankruptcy and 
Corporate Restructuring Project and can be reached at 
sadams@law.harvard.edu.  He gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance 
of Mark Roe, David Skeel, Jack Adams, David Adams… 
2 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Should Derivatives be Privileged 
in Bankruptcy, working paper (2012); Darrell Duffie & David A. Skeel, Jr., A 
Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and 
Repurchase Agreements, Working Paper (2012); David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas 
H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 152 (2012); Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: 
The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2010); David 
L. Mengle, Close-Out Netting and Risk Management in Over-The-Counter 
Derivatives, Working Paper (2010); Mark J. Roe, The Derivative’s Market’s 
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 
(2010); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2009). 
3 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank for 
Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287 (2011); Kimberly 
Summe, An Examination of Lehman Brothers’ Derivatives Portfolio Post-
Bankruptcy and Whether Dodd-Frank Would Have Made Any Difference, 
Working Paper (2011); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or 
Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL 
DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) 
CONSEQUENCES (2010); Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an 
Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important 
Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449 (2009). 
4 However, David Skeel and Thomas Jackson do raise this question briefly in 
Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 197–98. Derivative	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the out-of-bankruptcy bargained-for positions of creditors?  The question 
now is not whether the Bankruptcy Code can afford to take the risk, but 
whether the Bankruptcy Code will take the opportunity provided by the 
OLA to return to fulfilling its role. 
  The debate has focused around the chance that the default of a 
SIFI will cause a chain of consequent bankruptcies or major disruptions.  
The OLA addresses this risk and should allow the debate to refocus on 
what the best treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy is in the much larger 
percent of cases.  The Code should return to its central purpose of 
providing a debt collection system that protects the common pool, treats 
creditors fairly and equally, and does not shift value from some creditors 
to others without reason. 
Moreover, lest financial regulators think the derivative safe 
harbors are simply a technical problem for bankruptcy professionals, the 
derivative safe harbors create a number of structural problems when 
joined with the OLA that could reduce the accuracy and efficiency of 
financial resolutions.  The view that Title II makes bankruptcy reform 
unnecessary is thus doubly wrong. 
  This article develops as follows.  Part II describes what 
derivatives are and how they are treated under the bankruptcy safe 
harbors.  Part III introduces, but does not evaluate, the historical 
justifications for the bankruptcy safe harbors.  From early on, advocates 
have claimed that they reduced systemic risk by allowing financial 
institutions to immediately close out their derivative relationships with 
bankrupt counterparties and therefore minimize the risk of market 
volatility.  Part IV describes, but again does not evaluate, how the Dodd-
Frank Act resolves SIFIs under the OLA, looking in particular at its 
special access to funding and its ability to move good assets temporarily 
into bridge financial companies, as well as its ability to resolve SIFIs 
both before and after a bankruptcy petition has been filed.  Part V 
describes why the safe harbors violate basic bankruptcy principles and 
create problematic structural interactions after Dodd-Frank. Part VI 
concludes. 
II.  A PRIMER ON DERIVATIVES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy and financial regulation have developed in very 
different ways.  Therefore, bankruptcy practitioners may need an 
introduction to financial derivatives, and financial economists may need 
instruction about the basics of bankruptcy, and in particular how they 
apply to derivatives.  This part will do both.   The first section explains 
the basic concepts behind the most common derivative forms.  Next, it is 
shown how the bankruptcy safe harbors for derivatives developed in a 
deregulatory environment and that the safe harbors received very little 
scrutiny when they were first adopted.  The third part of this primer 
presents how the current bankruptcy safe harbors work in detail that will 
be useful in understanding which parts might be most useful for 
modification. Derivative	 ﾠSafe	 ﾠHarbors	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A. Derivatives Described 
What are derivatives?  Derivatives are financial contracts 
(contracts focused on money) that derive their ultimate value from a 
formula based on the value of an underlying asset (called the 
‘underlying’).
5  As the value of the underlying changes, the value of the 
contract changes.  
There are many, many different kinds of derivatives.  The most 
variation comes in a versatile form of derivative called a “swap” because 
the buyer and the seller “swap” cash flows, usually in the form of interest 
payments on pretend loans.
6  For instance, in an interest rate swap, the 
parties swap variable rate interest payments for fixed rate interest 
payments in the same currency on some made up amount of money they 
pretend to lend to each other.
7  The buyer (often a nonfinancial business 
of some kind) wants to reduce their exposure to interest rate volatility, 
say, but they are not able to borrow favorably at a fixed rate.  Therefore, 
they will enter an interest rate swap with a swap dealer who will pay 
them a variable rate while they pay the dealer a fixed rate (or rather, they 
will “net out” the two rates so that one will simply pay the other the 
difference between the two).  Swaps have been used to manage foreign 
exchange rates,
8 weather risks,
9 energy rates, credit risks,
10 and many 
other things.
11 Even within these types, you may have many, many kinds, 
with different underlyings, terms, and maturities.  The make-pretend 
amount that the interest rate payments are made on is called the “notional 
amount” and it is never actually exchanged. 
  Derivatives have always had a close relationship with 
bankruptcy.  Some firms have used them to great effect to fine tune their 
risk exposure to a wide range of factors that are out of their control. 
Southwest airlines used fuel hedges to mitigate huge oil price increases 
in the late 90s and early 2000s and to avoid the multiple trips through 
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5 See Rene M. Stulz, Demystifying Financial Derivatives, 2005 MILKEN INST. 
REV. 20, 20. 
6 See  JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 148 (6
th Ed. 
2005) (“A swap is an over-the-counter agreement between two companies to 
exchange cash flows in the future.”). 
7 See RENE M. STULZ, RISK MANAGEMENT & DERIVATIVES 505 (2005) (“[O]ne 
party receives fixed rate payments equal to the notional amount times the quoted 
fixed interest rate.  In exchange for receiving the fixed rate payments, the party 
pays the flowing rate times the notional amount.”). 
8 One account of the early growth of the derivative market suggest that it was the 
“breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system” in the 1970s 
which created demand for a financial innovation to help companies manage 
exchange rate fluctuations. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary 
Staff Report—Overview on Derivatives 3 (2010). 
9 See Geoffrey Considine, Introduction to Weather Derivatives, 1. 
10 See HULL, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 548–58. 
11 See, e.g., CFTC, Order Prohibiting the Listing or Trading of Political Event 
Contracts (2011); GAO Report on Issues Involving the Use of the Futures 
Markets to Invest in Commodity Indexes (2009); Travis L. Jones, An Overview 
of Investment Hedging with Stock Index Futures (2008). Derivative	 ﾠSafe	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bankruptcy that seemed standard in the airline industry.
12 Other firms, 
however, have been driven into insolvency (if not always bankruptcy) 
through misuse of derivatives.  Most recently, AIG’s unhedged 
involvement with Credit Default Swaps was the cause of its failure in the 
Financial Crisis.
13  Earlier, Long Term Capital Management’s brilliant 
option-trading strategy exploded in their face after Russia defaulted on 
its bonds in 1998 and required an industry bail-out (sometimes called a 
“bail-in”).
14  Bankruptcy creates a third concern for derivative parties, 
however, which is the sizeable risk if their counterparty enters 
bankruptcy.  
B.  Development of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors 
  The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 had limited safe harbors from the 
automatic stay for forwards and commodity contracts (futures)
15 based 
on concerns about their volatility.
16  However, as the use of derivatives 
exploded over the next decade and the kinds multiplied, driven by 
computer technology, the valuation power of the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formula, and increasing fluctuations in currency exchange rates
17 
and other market prices like gas and electricity prices, the Bankruptcy 
Code would eventually follow suit.   In 1984, Congress added 
protections for repurchase agreements.
18  In 1990, it exempted swap 
transactions.
19  Finally in 2005 and 2006, it expanded its protections for 
repurchase agreements and certain procedures associated with netting.
20 
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12 See, e.g., Southwest Annual Report 2 (2007), available at 
http://southwest.investorroom.com/company-reports. 
13 See Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR (August 
2009), available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/08/aig200908 
14 Statement of Alan Greenspan, 84 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 1046 (Dec 
2008). 
15 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 362(b)(6), 
548(d)(2)(B). 
16 See, e.g., Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 160–61. 
17 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Staff Report, Overview of 
Derivatives at 1; see also Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of 
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.POL. ECON. 637, 649-53 (1973) (deriving 
a valuation formula for options and applying it to corporate liabilities). 
18 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(7) (repurchase agreements exempt from stay); 11 U.S.C. 
§559 (repurchase agreements exempt from anti-ipso-facto provisions). 
19 11 U.S.C §362(b)(17) (swaps exempt from stay); 11 U.S.C. §560 (swaps 
exempt from anti-ipso-facto provisions). 
20 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §101(47) (expanded repurchase agreement definition); 11 
U.S.C. §362(b)(27) (master netting agreements exempt from stay); 11 U.S.C. 
§561 (exempt from anti-ipso-facto provision).  Steven Schwarcz and Ori Sharon 
have persuasively argued that the development of the safe harbors represents 
“path-dependent” legislation.  That means that the legislation grew up out of 
historical circumstances that may no longer apply, but which have constrained 
complete vetting of the legislation making discussion about them currently 
desirable.  See Steven Schwarcz and Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy Law Safe 
Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 Washington & Lee 
Law Review (forthcoming), available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3151. Derivative	 ﾠSafe	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 ﾠBankruptcy	 ﾠand	 ﾠDodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The final exemptions are broad.  In addition to futures and options, the 
Bankruptcy Code exempts a long list of different kind of swaps and any 
instrument similar to them.  The ultimate effect has been described as 
insulating the entire derivatives market from the operation of the 
Bankruptcy Code and courts.
21 
C. How the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors Work 
By 2006, the current structure of the derivative safe harbors was 
set, and it is useful to examine the role that each of the safe harbors plays 
in the overall effect.  The core of the safe harbors are found in sections 
559,
22 560,
23 and 561,
24 which apply respectively to repos, swap 
agreements, and master netting agreements (which is not the same as a 
ISDA contract, but is rather a contract that provides for netting between 
different products and contracts).  Tracing the development of the safe 
harbors, §559 was added in 1984, §560 in 1990, and §561 in 2005.  Each 
includes similar language, so I will provide §560 as an example: 
The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant or 
financial participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or 
acceleration of one or more swap agreements because of a 
condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title or 
to offset or net out any termination values or payment amounts 
arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, 
or acceleration of one or more swap agreements shall not be 
stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any 
provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative 
agency in any proceeding under this title.
25 
Section 365(e)(1) prohibits so-called ipso facto clauses, which provide 
for termination of the contract upon defaults of certain kinds, including 
filing for bankruptcy.
26  As a result, §§559–561 allow participants in 
repos, swaps, and master netting agreements to terminate their 
agreements upon the filing of bankruptcy by a counterparty and to net 
out the values, liquidate any collateral to the extent of any amount due 
from the bankrupt party, and to do all this without consulting the 
bankruptcy judge or the estate trustee.  As a belt-and-suspenders 
arrangement, §§362(b)(7), (17), and (27) provide specific safe harbors 
from the automatic stay and setoff limits for each of the three types of 
contracts, and §§546(f), (g), and (j) similarly emphasize safe harbors 
from preferences and constructive fraudulent conveyances. 
  Functionally the safe harbors work together like this.  The 
exemption from the ipso facto clause prohibition is critical because it 
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21 See generally Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and 
the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and 
Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641 (2005). 
22 11 U.S.C. §559. 
23 11 U.S.C. §560. 
24 11 U.S.C. §561. 
25 11 U.S.C. 560 (emphasis added). 
26 11 U.S.C. §365(e)(1). Derivative	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allows counter-parties who did not terminate their contracts before the 
bankruptcy filing to terminate the contracts after the filing, which 
otherwise would be prohibited.
27  Once terminated, the safe harbor from 
the stay on setoffs, allows the counterparty to net out the notional 
amounts of the derivative so that it is only the net amount that is owed.
28  
The inability to net out the notional amounts was one of the great 
concerns of the proponents for the safe harbors because derivative 
participants rightly pointed out that if counterparties could not net out 
their offsetting positions they might be found to owe the entire notional 
amount, which neither party had contemplated.  The exemption from the 
stay also allows derivative parties to seize and sell collateral, and repo 
counterparties to sell the underlying assets backing the transactions.
29  
Finally, the exemption from all preferences and fraudulent conveyance 
liability except for fraudulent conveyances of actual intent allows the 
parties to complete the terminations with the confidence that they will 
not be drawn back in.
30 The total effect is that derivatives and repurchase 
agreements may terminate and collect immediately from their collateral 
in bankruptcy. 
III. SAFE HARBOR JUSTIFICATIONS AND SYSTEMIC RISK  
The derivatives and repo safe harbors are an important deviation 
from the fundamental plan of the Bankruptcy Code.
31  Such a significant 
exception has required significant justifications.
32  Optimism about free 
markets and lack of understanding about these complex new instruments 
were a part of that justification, but the most important argument in favor 
of the justifications was the fear of systemic risk.
33  When several 
financial crises finally drew attention to the derivative safe harbors in the 
early 2000s and particularly during the financial crisis of 2008, the 
emerging criticisms of the safe harbors also focused on systemic risk: the 
systemic risk that the safe harbors contributed to the financial system by 
exacerbating the financial distress of major financial institutions.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act, influenced by this debate, developed a system 
explicitly to handle the systemic risk that comes with the financial 
distress of large derivative counterparties, an important part of which 
was Title II, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). 
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27 David Skeel and Thomas Jackson have suggested a minor modification to this 
exemption might bring much benefit if larger modifications are not possible. See 
Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2, at 199. 
28 See Mengle (2010), supra note 2 at 3; Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, 
Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout 8 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2005-03, 2005). 
29 See Kaufman & Bliss (2005), supra note 2 at 7. 
30 See Roe, Crisis Accelerator, supra note 2 at 548. 
31 See infra Part V. 
32 However, for an argument that the legislation that led to the safe harbors was 
under-considered because of historical reasons, see generally Schwarcz & 
Sharon, supra note 20. 
33 See id. at 15. Derivative	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A. Safe Harbors as Systemic Risk Mitigaters 
The original passing of the safe harbors was uncontroversial.  
The risk of a “ripple effect” that might result from a bankruptcy filing by 
a major participant in the financial markets, as well as the unique 
economic nature of derivatives, obviously seemed to justify special 
treatment.  Congressmen made statements such as this one by Senator 
Dole to explain the urgent need for exemption: 
It is essential that stockbrokers and securities clearing agencies 
be protected from the issuance of a court or administrative 
agency order which would stay the prompt liquidation of an 
insolvent’s positions, because market fluctuations in the 
securities markets create an inordinate risk that the insolvency of 
one party could trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies of the 
others who carry accounts for that party and undermine the 
integrity of those markets.
34 
These statements usually contained references to the unusual volatility of 
financial markets, which can “move significantly in a matter of 
minutes,”
35 and the immediacy with which counterparties needed their 
contracts resolved.  Nonetheless, most cited early public discussion was 
marked both by vagueness and by lack of opposition.
36  The safe harbors 
were crafted in a period of great optimism about the importance of 
derivatives markets and the ability of free market forces to control them. 
  The newness and complexity of derivative instruments were 
obstacles to full understanding of what they were capable of and how 
they should be used.  One example of how incomplete understandings of 
how derivatives would interact with the Bankruptcy Code affected the 
development of the safe harbors is the early concerns about cherry-
picking.  Derivative observers worried that in the absence of bankruptcy 
safe harbors, ISDA master contracts would be disaggregated into their 
many individual transactions, each of which would be subject to the 
debtor’s ability to assume and reject contracts.
37  Since derivatives are 
usually considered in net, not in gross, when setting collateral or 
controlling exposure, disaggregation would allow the debtor significant 
power to assume the transactions that had ended up being profitable 
while rejecting those that were not profitable and leaving those 
counterparties to get cents-on-the-dollar as unsecured creditors.
38 More 
recently scholars have suggested these fears may have been overblown.
39 
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34 Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW 1507, 1510 (2004) 
(citing Statement of Senator Dole, 128 Cong. Rec. S15981 (daily ed. July 13, 
1982)). 
35 Statement of Senator DeConcini.  See Vasser, supra note 34 at 1511 (citing 
135 Cong. Rec. S1416 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989)). 
36 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 160. 
37 See, e.g., John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 
112 BANKING L.J. 638, 640 (1995). 
38 See Mengle, supra note 2 at 7. 
39 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 187 (“Under bankruptcy’s setoff 
provision, a creditor is entitled to offset mutual obligations that it and the debtor Derivative	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Even barring that, though, it is telling that instead of addressing the 
specific problem of the unity of the contracts, the solution adopted was 
an exemption.  The cherry-picking concern reflects well the sense that 
many people were not sure how these unfamiliar innovations would be 
considered under a variety of bankruptcy laws. 
  In the case that uncertainties caused by novelty and complexity 
were insufficient, advocates for derivative special treatment had a trump 
card.
40  Staying derivative transactions, they argued, could create 
systemic risk through a potential cascade of consequent bankruptcies.  If 
the stay applied to derivatives, the debtor could demand that the 
counterparties perform on their responsibilities while using the stay as a 
shield to fend off counterparty demands for debtor performance.
41  The 
counterparties could thus be stuck in an unpleasant limbo that might be 
tolerable as long as the markets were favorable to them, but would 
prevent them from rebalancing their portfolio and adjusting as market 
conditions changed.  An unfavorable market change could be levered 
many times in unintended ways, creating allegedly disastrous results.  
When one considered that it could be well over a year before many 
creditors saw their claims or contracts resolved, the likelihood for 
disaster was high.  Thus, one large derivative player who went bankrupt 
could unbalance its counterparties.  A significant disruption in their 
credit position could lead to collateral calls and liquidity issues that could 
further unbalance other derivative participants, potentially creating a 
chain reaction of disruptions that could roll through a financial system.  
The threat of such a scenario coupled with the recognition of how 
important derivatives were to the growing economy was quite 
convincing, particularly when no one was questioning it.
42  It would take 
twenty years until anyone came to really question this thesis, and even 
then, two of those early scholars would be able to say, “This systemic 
risk argument has been the major rationale used to justify the enactment 
of legislation and regulations providing these securities with special 
protections.”
43  
The argument from systemic risk was the most important 
argument behind the safe harbors, but recent events have indicated that it 
is, at best, incomplete in some important ways.  Numerous critics have 
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owe to one another.  Because many, and perhaps all, of the obligations under a 
master agreement would be treated as mutual obligations, the debtor would not 
be able to pick and choose which derivatives to assume. The debtor would be 
required to either assume or reject all of the derivatives in a single master 
agreement. The cherry picking fear is thus misguided as it relates to a single 
master agreement.”). 
40 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 162 (“The [need to keep systemic risk in 
check]…tended to silence any lingering objections….”). 
41 Skeel & Jackson suggest that this concern was likely overstated and that the 
Bankruptcy Code without the safe harbors would have a much more nuanced 
treatment of derivatives.  See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2, at 185. 
42 “In a lawsuit the first to speak seems right, until someone comes forward and 
cross-examines.” Proverbs 18:17 (New International Version). 
43 See Bliss & Kaufman (2005), supra note 2 at 1. Derivative	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arisen who argue that the safe harbors may exacerbate the financial 
distress of large financial institutions and in that way actually create 
systemic risk.   
B. Safe Harbors as Systemic Risk Creators 
The criticisms of the derivatives safe harbors in bankruptcy, 
particularly since the financial crisis of 2008, have focused on the 
possible ways that the safe harbors themselves contribute to systemic 
risk, both through the exacerbation of financial distress and through the 
undermining of market controls that might work to mitigate such 
distress.   
The fear of the effects of the disorderly termination of a large 
number of derivatives and repos in LTCM’s distress first was one of the 
reasons that the government strong-armed its largest creditors into 
offering it a bailout.
44  Later, the Lehman bankruptcy provided tangible 
evidence of this risk.  Lehman’s restructuring advisers have estimated 
that the disorderly termination of Lehman’s derivative portfolio may 
have cost the Lehman estate $50 billion.
45  In addition, the market for a 
variety of different kinds of derivatives was thrown into disarray after the 
Lehman bankruptcy for months.
46   
Scholars have suggested that the safe harbors might contribute to 
systemic risk different ways.  The risk of collateral runs can make 
financial institutions more susceptible to financial crises Collateral runs 
occur in a system where derivative and repo counterparties may not be 
fully collateralized (and traditional credit decision criteria have allowed 
many counterparties to post less or no collateral).  When the market gets 
a hint that a firm may be in trouble, creditors will exercise rights to 
increase the collateral supporting their contracts (these are called 
“collateral calls”).
47 The effect of sudden, market-wide collateral calls 
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44 In 1998, Alan Greenspan, as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, explained the intervention in LTCM’s crisis as follows: 
“[T]he act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio in a forced liquidation [precipitate by 
LTCM’s derivative counterparties] would not only have a significant distorting 
impact on market prices, but also in the process could produce large losses—or 
worse—for a number of creditors and counterparties, and for other markets [sic] 
participants who were not directly involved with LTCM….” (testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. On 
Banking and Fin. Servs., 105
th Cong. 23 (1998), as cited in Franklin R. Edwards 
& Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special 
Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2005). 
45 See Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed 
Billions in Value, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A10. 
46 See Michael Mackenzie, Negative 30-year swap rate spread linger, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (September 9, 2009) (“A year after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, which sparked chaos across derivatives markets, one striking 
dislocation persists; a negative 30-year interest rate swap spread.”), available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3be4e8b8-9d5c-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0.html. 
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can be similar to a bank run,
48 causing an immediate liquidity crisis.  
Failure to meet a collateral call can be an event of default, triggering 
events possibly including the termination of the contracts.
49  Because of 
cross-default clauses, termination of one party’s contracts will mean the 
termination of all other derivative and repo contracts.  Thus, failure to 
meet a collateral call can be deadly, but in the effort to avoid default, a 
firm can drain itself of capital. 
  A similar pattern could happen with ordinary secured credit.  A 
secured creditor might be more relaxed about the status of its security 
while its debtor is doing well, but as soon as there is a hint of trouble, it 
might start asking for more security or better security.
50  A default under 
one contract could trigger cross-default clauses leading to various 
creditors trying to collect against debtor assets.
51  In reality, this situation 
rarely pans out because a debtor would file for bankruptcy far in 
advance. In fact, the creditors know this and know that bankruptcy will 
impose costs on them, so they usually try to work together with the 
debtor in advance.  However, because of the absence of the stay and 
preference, derivatives are a different world. 
  In addition to a collateral run aggravating financial distress, mass 
termination of derivatives can lead to mass sales of collateral as creditors 
seize collateral and try to liquidate it before the liquidations of other 
creditors drive the price down.  The effect of these firesale losses can be 
serious.
52 Had a large derivative party like Bear Stearns run out of liquid 
collateral and posted their mortgage-backed securities as collateral to 
their repos during the financial crisis, as the 2005 Bankruptcy Code 
amendments permit, and had counterparties tried to sell them en masse, it 
could have caused the bottom to fall out of the mortgage-backed security 
market, spreading distress to others.  Some people have suggested that 
this is in fact what Bear Stearns did, and it may have been one reason for 
their bailout.
53   
Another risk mentioned early
54 and analyzed carefully by Mark 
Roe is the potential for the derivative safe harbors to shift risk from 
derivative or repo counterparties to lower-priority counterparties.
55  Such 
a risk-shifting arrangement would act as a subsidy by lower priority 
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48 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 
Working Paper 4 (2010) (“The features of [the breakdown in the “shadow 
banking system”] are similar to those from previous banking panics—safe, 
liquid assets suddenly appeared to be unsafe, leading to runs.”). 
49 See Kaufman & Bliss (2005), supra note 2, at 19. 
50 This may be particularly true for a creditor whose collateral is fluid, like an 
inventory or accounts receivable lender, or an auto floorplan lender. 
51 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, The LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 11–
12 (1986). 
52 See Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy, 
Working Paper (2012). 
53 See Nathan Goralnik, Note: Bankruptcy Proof Finance and the Supply of 
Liquidity, 122 YALE L. J. 460, 465 (2012). 
54 See Bliss & Kaufman (2005), supra note 2 at 20–21. 
55 See generally Roe, Crisis Accelerator, supra note 2. Derivative	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creditors (in particular the United States, as guarantor of the financial 
system) of higher priority creditors (like the derivative counterparties).
56  
This subsidy comes about because the priorities allow the derivative 
counterparty to carry less risk than their contracts create.  Because a 
party would be shifting a sizeable portion of the risk of its contract to the 
other creditors of the counterparty, it would have less incentive to screen 
its counterparties carefully and to monitor their creditworthiness, which 
could lead to lower quality risk management practices and higher 
systemic risk.  In addition, subsidies by non-derivative parties to 
derivative parties would tend to artificially inflate the size of the 
derivative and repo market beyond what its own risk would justify 
without the subsidy, which would also increase the risk in the system.
57   
The purpose of this article is not to evaluate the arguments that 
the safe harbors contribute to systemic risk.  We will see that the Dodd-
Frank Act may implicitly accept these risks as true, and so the key point 
here is to explain some of the ways that the consensus around the utility 
of the safe harbors has unraveled and why a new approach was felt to be 
needed.  The initial response was the Dodd-Frank Act, and particularly 
Title II, which created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).   
IV. DODD-FRANK’S TITLE II AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 was Congress’s response to the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.  Hailed as the most important piece of financial 
regulation since the New Deal,
58 it was designed to be a comprehensive 
response to the problems revealed in the financial crisis.  It focused in 
particular on creating infrastructure that could handle problems of 
systemic risk, and one of the key pieces of that infrastructure was a new 
financial resolution system designed for systemically risky companies, 
the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”)—Dodd-Frank’s response to 
the problem of too-big-to-fail finance.
59   
The filing of Lehman Brothers for bankruptcy was perhaps one 
of the most controversial occurrences in the financial crisis.
60  A variety 
of academics and policymakers attributed the severity of the financial 
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56 See Roe, Crisis Accelerator, supra note 2 at 581. 
57 See Roe, Crisis Accelerator, supra note 2 at 542. 
58 See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act–Two Years 
Later, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, 1, (describing the Dodd-Frank Act as 
“unparalleled in scope and depth since the New Deal”) available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil_Alert_Dodd_Frank_Act_Two_Years_L
ater.pdf.  
59 Dodd Frank Act, Title II. 
60 See, e.g., NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3, at 19–39 (describing and 
critiquing the “Lehman myth”); see also Kimberly Summe, Misconceptions 
about Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy and the Role Derivatives Played, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 16 (2011) (describing misconceptions about the Lehman 
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crisis to it, or at least blamed it for triggering the credit panic.
61  The 
manner in which it accomplished this is disputed,
62 but the fact that it 
was the turning point in the crisis is generally agreed.  Geithner and 
Paulson say that they decided not to intervene with Lehman because they 
did not have the legal authority to resolve Lehman properly or really to 
extend them a bailout.
63  The OLA fixed that problem.    
  At the time of its introduction, there was a significant debate 
about the best way to manage systemic risk such as the risk that 
culminated in the Financial Crisis.  Some advocates argued that the 
Bankruptcy Code was the institution designed to handle that task,
64 but 
other involved parties, including several influential policymakers, 
viewed the Bankruptcy Code as insufficient to the task.
65  This latter 
view is widely viewed to have won out in the adoption of the Dodd 
Frank Act.
66   
The OLA has been subject to doubt as to how well it will handle 
systemic risk without causing a bailout.
67  If such speculations are 
correct, they would increase the urgency of modifying the derivative safe 
harbors in order to support Dodd-Frank’s deficiencies.  However, 
because in this Article I show that Dodd-Frank and the OLA actually 
increase the need to address the derivative safe harbors even if they are 
effective, I will paint a more optimistic picture of the OLA in action and 
also accept various criticisms of bankruptcy on face value, even though 
many are contested.  I make these assumptions to demonstrate that even 
if the OLA works as it is supposed to, it actually amplifies the argument 
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61 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3, at 21 for list of scholars and the 
implications they have drawn from the Lehman bankruptcy. 
62 See supra note 60. 
63 See generally supra note 3. 
64 See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 3; NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3, 
at 129–154; THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL 
CHAPTER 14 (2012). 
65 See Morrison, supra note 3; See also Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. 
Bair, “Ending Too Big to Fail: The FDIC and Financial Reform”, 2010 Glauber 
Lecture at the John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum; Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 
(October 20, 2010) (“One big reason [for the bailouts] is that neither bank 
holding companies nor non-bank financial companies, both of which figured 
prominently in the crisis, were subject to an FDIC-like receivership 
authority….Instead these entities were subject to the commercial bankruptcy 
process, where it takes a long time and a lot of money to determine what 
creditors ultimately stand to collect.”). 
66 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 3, at 287. 
67 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3, at 129; Baird & Morrison, supra 
note 3, at 313–15.  Even many financial regulators are concerned about the 
effectiveness of the OLA, particularly in cross-border cases, and so they have 
developed the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) procedure which would take only 
the holding company for a financial entity into bankruptcy and restructure the 
entire entity through the one point of entry.  In theory the SPOE process may 
avoid both the safe harbors and Title II, but it will only really apply to FSOC 
designated SIFIs. If unregulated financial companies (non or borderline SIFIs) 
have no private resolution option, public resolution options will still face 
pressure to expand to include them. Derivative	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for modifying the safe harbors by removing the central justification for 
their breadth: the need to prevent systemic risk.   
A. Systemic Risk in Bankruptcy and Title II 
As we have seen, the most powerful justification for the safe 
harbors was the threat of systemic risk.
68  Yet, it is precisely this 
systemic risk that the OLA addresses.  By many accounts, it represents a 
faster, more powerful resolution authority for the riskiest failures that are 
beyond what Bankruptcy can manage currently.  While the effectiveness 
of the OLA is still untested, my purpose here is to demonstrate how it 
was tailored vis-à-vis the Bankruptcy Code to address concerns about 
systemic risk. 
Early criticism of the Bankruptcy Code argued that judicial 
approval was too slow a process for the high pace of decisions needed in 
a major crisis.
69  The OLA contains procedures and powers to allow it to 
move very quickly, and to make decisions quickly by a centralized 
person who is very familiar with these issues.  The Secretary of the 
Treasury, to take action, must merely get the consent of the Board of 
Directors of the firm.
70  Only if that is not forthcoming must the 
Secretary seek out judicial approval, which will be a very highly 
streamlined process that must occur within 24 hours.
71  Once the 
receivership begins, the FDIC has great power and discretion in 
operating, without the need for lots of hearings and approval. The OLA, 
therefore, contains a very quick and centralized process or resolution, 
which critics have suggested the Bankruptcy Code lacks.
72   
Another place where the OLA may be superior to the 
Bankruptcy Code in handling systemic risk is in the ability to prepare for 
resolution.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires SIFIs to submit and keep up-
to-date resolution plans that should be helpful in encouraging greater 
distress-preparedness.
73  Whether companies will respond to these 
requirements in useful ways is an open question, but the OLA at least 
creates this possibility. 
A third advantage that the OLA provides is the ability to borrow 
from the Federal Reserve in order to provide DIP financing to the 
resolution subject.
74  Because the OLA is most likely to be invoked 
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68 See supra Part III. 
69 See Morrison, supra note 3, at 461 (“Federal law permits this kind of speed 
when the FDIC seizes a bank….[I]t seems overly optimistic to expect that every 
bankruptcy judge would act with the same dispatch as the judge did in the 
Lehman bankruptcy case.”). 
70 Act § 202(a)(l)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i). 
71 Act § 202(a)(l)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i). 
72 See supra note 65. 
73 Dodd Frank Act § 165(d). 
74 See FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., under 
the Dodd-Frank Act 9 at note 44, 5 FDIC QUARTERLY (2011) (“The FDIC may 
issue or incur obligations pursuant to an approved orderly liquidation plan (up to 
10 percent of the total consolidated assets of the covered financial company) and 
pursuant to an approved mandatory repayment plan (up to 90 percent of the fair Derivative	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within a financial crisis when credit may not be forthcoming particularly 
for an already-insolvent entity, this is an important ability.  Furthermore, 
the FDIC under the OLA is able to provide what is essentially DIP 
financing that will avoid some of the necessities firms sometimes are put 
to in Chapter 11 by their DIP financiers.
75  Arranging DIP financing is 
often one of the highest priorities in a large bankruptcy, and it can 
require a great deal of time in ordinary circumstances. This power meets 
another open concern about systemic risk in financial crises. 
Finally, the OLA contains greater optionality than the 
Bankruptcy Code does right now in how it handles derivatives within a 
resolution. The OLA contains aspects of all three major tools used to 
deal with systemically risky financial companies, particularly financial 
companies with significant derivative portfolios during the Financial 
Crisis,
76 and a policymaker could apply whichever one made most sense.  
First, the presence of the one-day stay creates the possibility that the 
Treasury could put together a fast sale of the company or just the 
derivative portfolio and use the power of the stay and the transfer 
authority to make the transfer.  During the Financial Crisis, when Bear 
Stearns failed, the Federal Reserve negotiated its quick sale to J.P. 
Morgan,
77 over a weekend.
78 While a one-day stay is short, it could be 
extended to four days if carefully planned.
79  In addition, if the OLA had 
been working with the financial institution in advance, as the FDIC says 
it does,
80 it might indeed have enough time to make that transfer.  
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value of the total consolidated assets of the covered financial company that are 
available for repayment).  See section 210(n)(6) and (9) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)(6) and (9).  To the extent that the assets in the receivership 
are insufficient to repay Treasury for any borrowed funds, any creditor who 
received an additional payment in excess of what other similarly situated 
creditors received, which additional payment was not essential to the 
implementation of the receivership or the bridge financial company, may have 
the additional payment clawed back.  See section 210(o)(1)(D)(i) of the Dodd-
Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i).  This provision is consistent with Title 
II’s directive to minimize moral hazard.  To the extent that the clawbacks of 
additional payments are insufficient to repay Treasury for any borrowed funds, 
the FDIC is required to assess the industry.  See section 210(o)(1)(B) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(B).”) 
75 Id. at 7. 
76 See FDIC, supra note 74 at 1 (describing how the FDIC would have applied 
the tools of the OLA to the Lehman bankruptcy).  But see Summe, supra note 3 
(arguing that the OLA would not have changed the Lehman Brother’s 
bankruptcy significantly and that current bankruptcy rules are sufficient). 
77 Steve Schaefer, A Look Back at Bear Stearns, Five Years After Its Shotgun 
Marriage to JPMorgan, FORBES.COM, March 14, 2013, at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013/03/14/a-look-back-at-bear-
stearns-five-years-after-its-shotgun-marriage-to-jpmorgan/. 
78 Id. 
79 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3 at 143. 
80 See FDIC, supra note 74, at 11 (describing how important early work with 
Lehman would have been to prepare for resolution). Derivative	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Suggestions about remedying the bankruptcy safe harbors have focused 
on a sale of the derivative portfolio.
81   
  In addition, another approach that was used during the Financial 
Crisis was for the government to guarantee the troubled assets.  Indeed, 
both Bear Stearns and AIG received these sorts of “bail-out” guarantees.  
While the idea of bailing out failing financial institutions has become 
distasteful, the government guarantee of Bear Stearns and AIG was 
effective in preventing them from failing and would be effective at 
preventing a set of rolling failures.  The OLA contains an element of 
guarantee.  It is authorized to draw on the Federal Reserve in order to 
lend money to a Bridge Financial Company, in a similar vein to a 
Debtor-in-Possession loan in bankruptcy.
82  One potential use for this 
money that is clearly authorized is for the bridge financial company to 
bolster the collateral of its derivatives.
83  Thus, if a sale or transfer is not 
easily achieved, this guarantee could help float the portfolio along until it 
could be more favorably liquidated.  This might be particularly effective 
where previously liquid assets, such as mortgage-backed securities, were 
made illiquid by market conditions. 
  Finally, the OLA does not completely reject the option of 
allowing the derivatives to terminate and the counterparties to close-out 
their positions.  Title II only allows for a one-day stay on ipso-facto 
clauses, after which the derivatives terminate and can be closed-out.  In 
fact, the only option other than to allow the derivatives to terminate is for 
the FDIC to notify the counterparty within the one day that their 
derivative is going to be assumed and transferred.  If it is just not 
feasible to transfer the derivative portfolio, or if the chance of systemic 
risk from the derivative terminations is low (the OLA is not limited to 
dealing with systemic risk from derivatives), then the FDIC might simply 
find it makes the most sense just to allow the portfolio to terminate.  This 
was, in fact, what the Federal Reserve allowed to happen with Lehman 
Brothers.
84  Outside the value loss from the chaotic close-out, the 
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81 See, e.g., Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2, at 198 (“The stay would halt a run by 
the institution’s derivatives counterparties long enough to facilitate a sale or 
other disposition of key assets.”),  
82 See Dodd Frank Act § 204(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (authorizing receiver to 
fund liquidation); see also Baird & Morrison, supra note 3, at 288 (2011). 
83 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3 at 143. 
84 Several articles have been written evaluating whether Title II would have 
made any difference for the Lehman Bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Summe, supra note 
3; FDIC, supra note 74.  However, the much more interesting question for me is 
whether the OLA would have handled AIG and Bear Stearns better.  In 
retrospect, in terms of dangers from derivatives, Lehman was actually not a 
tremendous risk to the system.  Much of the danger from its bankruptcy was 
caused by “informational contagion” as the market realized how bad the 
situation was, and became uncertain what the government would do, see NEW 
FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3, at Ch. 2.  However, compared with Bear or 
AIG, Lehman’s derivatives were not too toxic and have ended up being an asset.  
Bear, however, was using mortgage-backed securities for its repos, and AIG had 
a very illiquid derivative portfolio.  If either of those portfolios had been Derivative	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derivatives were largely terminated without serious harm caused to the 
derivative counterparties.
85  A similar thing happened with the Enron 
bankruptcy.
86  However, it should be noted that, as it turned out, both of 
those bankruptcies had been caused by aspects of the business outside of 
the derivative portfolio.
87  In Enron’s bankruptcy, their derivatives ended 
up being a net asset, which was also the case in Lehman’s, despite the 
value loss.
88  However, where the crisis was caused by losses in or the 
failure of the derivative portfolio itself, such as in LTCM, Bear Stearns, 
or AIG, the risk of the negative side effects of mass terminations are 
more acute.
89 
The OLA was designed to resolve SIFIs, not to replace 
Bankruptcy.  However, this higher resolutionary firepower does not 
come free.  Consideration of the OLA’s costs is helpful for thinking 
about why policymakers should not allow it to encroach in situations 
where bankruptcy could work effectively.   
B. Costs of Title II 
Use of the OLA should not be extended beyond where systemic 
risk requires its use because it carries numerous costs with it, both direct 
and indirect.  Most directly, the OLA has some characteristics of a “bail-
out” or rescue loan.
90  Rescue loans create direct costs to taxpayers of 
providing financing and taking on significant risk that the loan may not 
be paid back.
91  The OLA limits risk to taxpayers by creating a waterfall 
for the handling of the costs of funding: first they have access to the 
unsecured assets of the resolution, then they can clawback assets 
returned to creditors above and beyond what other equally-situated 
creditors received, and then they must assess industry.
92    
However, the OLA produces direct costs to the taxpayer in other 
ways, even if all loans are repaid.  It is very manpower intensive, 
particularly as generally the FDIC displaces current management and 
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terminated in mass, the negative effect on the market could have been much 
worse. 
85 See Summe, supra note 60, at 19 (2011) (“At present, [Lehman’s derivative 
subsidiary] represents about 40 percent of all cash and cash investment positions 
in the entire Lehman Brothers estate.”). 
86 See Morrison & Edwards, supra note 2, at 103–04 (2005) (describing the 
surprising “success” of the Enron bankruptcy and some distinctions between it 
and LTCM).  
87 See Summe, supra note 60 at 1–2 (“Misconception #1: Derivatives Caused 
Lehman Brothers’ Failure”); Edwards & Morrison, supra note 2 at 104 
(“Enron’s derivatives trading arm was its only profitable operation.”). 
88 See Summe, supra note 60 at 18–19. 
89 See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 2 at 105. 
90 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 3, at 485–86 (2010) (describing costs of 
rescue loans). 
91 Id. at 484. 
92 See § 210(n)(6) and (9) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)(6) and 
(9); § 210(o)(1)(D)(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(D)(i); § 
210(o)(1)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(B). Derivative	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manages the company itself.
93  In addition, with rescue loans the saying 
may be true, “In for a penny, in for a pound.”  Once you start offering 
rescue loans to a distressed company, it is hard to say no if they need 
more.  The U.S. government initially gave AIG a loan of $85 billion, but 
by November, AIG had to come back and ask for more.  The loan was 
eventually raised to over $150 billion.
94   
A second cost is the increase in moral hazard such interventions 
create.
95  Shareholders and debtholders may be more willing to endure 
risk if they believe they have a higher chance that they will be bailed out.  
The price of credit default swaps on Lehman’s debt did not spike until 
very shortly before its bankruptcy, indicating that the market was not 
expecting Lehman to default, despite its distress.
96  The market expected 
a bailout, in other words.  The OLA addresses this problem by providing 
for harsh treatment for different groups.  The effectiveness of this 
treatment will depend upon how it is carried out.  Financial crises are 
hazy and quick-moving things, and sometimes the FDIC may have more 
important things to do than imposing costs on creditors who might 
themselves be in distress and close to needing resolution.  The key 
problem here is that these rules are hard to predict and will hopefully not 
be invoked enough to create serious precedent.   
  A third cost is the distortion of corporate governance decision-
making.  Distressed companies often have a change of management, but 
it is usually at the insistence of the Board of Directors and shareholders. 
In the rescue loans offered to AIG, Treasury Secretary Paulson made the 
resignation of Robert Willumstad, AIG’s CEO, a condition of the bailout 
loan.
97  But the fact that AIG’s board of directors might have made the 
same decision does not disguise the fact that the introduction of the 
Treasury Secretary introduces political factors into the decision.  Instead 
of the Board judging the right time (for instance, it might be useful to 
have the current management carry it into bankruptcy or the OLA), 
concerns about the political response may require an earlier decision than 
is optimal.
98 
  Some costs are particular to the specific political forces that 
formed the OLA.  The backlash against bailouts led to a strong emphasis 
on liquidation within the OLA (hence its name).  The Boxer Amendment 
requires that any company subject to OLA resolution be liquidated.
99 The 
FDIC may be able to skirt this requirement by reorganizing through a 
bridge financial company, but the textual emphasis on liquidation may 
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93 Also, the FDIC has suggested the possibility of keeping an FDIC team in 
place at all systemically important institutions to keep them prepared for 
resolution, which would involve quite a commitment.  See FDIC, supra note 74, 
at 11. 
94 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2, at 166. 
95 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 3 at 485. 
96 See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 2 at 164.  
97 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 3 at 487. 
98 Id.  
99 See Dodd Frank § 214. Derivative	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subject them to higher political pressure.  Not all companies that enter 
resolution may be economic failures, though.  They may have had a 
liquidity crisis at the same time as a credit crisis and been unable to 
service their debt, and thus their underlying business may be just fine.  
The FDIC could move them to a Bridge Financial Company, but the high 
overhead costs to the FDIC of managing a reorganization likely would 
make them poorly suited towards a drawn-out reorganization if they were 
managing it.
100  It is true that the FDIC in those situations would try to 
sell the company to another company, but for many major financial 
companies, like Bank of America or Citibank, a reasonable, antitrust-
approved buyer might be hard to find.  And in any case, such a sale 
would likely only further concentrate an already concentrated financial 
services sector.
101  The politically-driven liquidation focus of the OLA 
might be a cost make reorganization of even economically promising 
companies more difficult. 
  Finally, a fifth cost is that most of the other four costs increase as 
the use of the OLA scales up.  They are variable costs, not fixed costs 
that can be spread.  The costs of the FDIC manpower to resolve 
complicated financial institutions would be directly proportion to the 
number of institutions they supervised.  The moral hazard risk would 
arguably increase as more entities faced the prospect of being resolved 
by the OLA instead of bankruptcy (although, it is possible that 
uncertainty about OLA procedures might decrease with use, though the 
moral hazard risk would increase prospectively while the uncertainty 
would only decrease retrospectively).  The distortions of corporate 
governance would have more serious impact as its possibility grew and 
created uncertainty about what set of rules would govern companies in 
financial distress.  Political pressure to liquidate companies that should 
economically be reorganized would also create more serious distortions 
as it was used more widely.  This scale-cost is not surprising, because the 
OLA was not designed to be used widely.  However, we will see in the 
next section that failure to improve the way that bankruptcy treats 
derivatives could aggravate these inefficiencies in ways not intended 
under the statute. 
No doubt the debate about how the OLA will handle systemic 
risk will continue.  However, the new resolution rules do seem to contain 
more optionality than the Bankruptcy Code currently, and there may be a 
reasonable basis for optimism that despite their costs, they will have the 
tools needed to manage very serious systemic risk.  The question that 
remains is whether we could better control systemic risk at a lower 
systemic cost if our Bankruptcy Code was aligned with and worked with 
the OLA rather than against it.  I argue that it would. 
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100 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3 at 149–50. 
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V. SAFE HARBOR PROBLEMS AFTER TITLE II 
As we have seen, systemic risk was the most powerful and 
important argument in favor of the exemption of derivatives from the 
core facilities of the Bankruptcy Code.  However, because the OLA 
represents a holistic and powerful way to deal with the systemic risks of 
the financial distress of a major financial institution, that concern may be 
much less important now. The derivative safe harbors are oriented 
towards liquidation, particularly for parties where derivatives make up a 
large part of their assets base.  However, Chapter 11 is designed to allow 
for reorganization in order to retain the going-concern value of the 
firm,
102 or at least, reorganization by sale, if not through plan 
confirmation.
103   
In addition, the architects of the Dodd-Frank Act, by choosing 
the OLA with the assume-and-transfer potentiality built into it, at least 
latently (and under strict limits) rejected bankruptcy’s terminate-and-
liquidate approach to distress involving derivatives.
104  Despite its name, 
the OLA has a more reorganization-centric approach to derivatives than 
Chapter 11 has.
105  Sandwiched between the reorganization-focus of 
Chapter 11 and the reorganization potentiality of the OLA, the 
liquidation-focus of the derivative safe harbors stands out as an oddity 
and demands justification.   Thus, in the absence of a compelling 
justification for the unmodified total safe harbors for derivatives and 
repos, I suggest that their continuation in duplication of the OLA is 
essentially inefficient within the bankruptcy framework and leads to less 
efficient decisionmaking by both OLA decisionmakers and the debtor.  
A. Are the Safe Harbors Necessary in a Dodd-Frank World? 
The safe harbors are out of step with bankruptcy’s own 
framework.  It is sometimes said that the goal of bankruptcy is to enable 
the efficient transition of assets to their highest value uses by overcoming 
inefficiencies related to a common pool problem
106 or liquidity-related 
problems.
107  Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 overcome the collective 
action problems implicit in debt collection against an insolvent debtor 
through separating the decision of how to use the assets from the 
decision of how to distribute the assets.
108  The derivative safe harbors, 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
102 See LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 51 at, 14–15. 
103 See Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2007) (suggesting explanation for increase in sales through 
bankruptcy). 
104 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3 at 10 (contrasting OLA rules with 
predictability of bankruptcy law).  
105 See Morrison & Baird, supra note 3 at 308–10 (comparing resolution power 
to reorganize qualified financial contracts with bankruptcy’s exemptions). 
106 See David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy and Economic 
Growth 3 (Univ. of Penn. Faculty Scholarship, Paper 476, 2013) available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/476. 
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however, merge those two decisions together and place them back in the 
hands of the individual creditors, where the incentives are strong for each 
creditor to close out his position as quickly as possible.
109  Moreover, 
even though derivatives are financial instruments and financial 
instruments that are liquid are often considered fungible,
110 the Lehman 
bankruptcy has demonstrated the termination of large quantities of 
derivatives at the same time often involves significant transaction 
costs.
111  Lehman’s restructuring advisor has estimated that the safe 
harbors contributed to the disorderly termination of Lehman’s derivative 
portfolio that might have cost Lehman’s unsecured creditors up to $50 
billion in value.
112 
This argument should not be taken too far, however.  I have 
argued in a different paper with Mark Roe that while the safe harbors are 
inefficient, so also the baseline bankruptcy rules would be inefficient if 
applied to financial derivatives.
113  The derivative market is uniquely 
volatile which ought to be considered in crafting bankruptcy rules for it.  
Yet, the current safe harbors provide too little flexibility for maintaining 
any value that a derivative portfolio has to the debtor’s estate. New 
solutions are required and several are in the process of being proposed.
114  
No doubt the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation 
Authority will need to be examined during these discussions, and that 
may be good.  But the belief that Title II will be a replacement for 
bankruptcy reform, and therefore that the two systems are necessarily in 
competition, is false.  Even advocates of a government-backed resolution 
system for SIFIs should be interested in a bankruptcy system that 
supports the efficient resolution of large financial institutions and does 
not interfere with it. 
B. The Safe Harbors Distortion of OLA Intervention Decisions 
In addition to being inefficient within the scheme of bankruptcy 
on their own, the retention of the safe harbors within the Bankruptcy-
OLA system may actually hinder the effectiveness of the OLA at high 
systemic cost. The safe harbors make it costly for the OLA 
decisionmakers to wait until an entity has filed bankruptcy to make a 
final decision to intervene.  They must therefore make a decision to 
intervene or not before a company files bankruptcy, when information is 
poorer and political costs higher.   
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1. The Costs of Premature Decisionmaking 
Dodd-Frank provides numerous tools for systemic risk 
dispersion.  The safe harbors, however, interfere with the effectiveness of 
one important tool: the ability to intervene after a SIFI has filed for 
bankruptcy.
115  Once a bankruptcy has triggered the liquidation 
tendencies within the derivative safe harbors, OLA intervention loses 
significant potency.  Once a firm files for bankruptcy, their derivatives 
either automatically terminate or at least provide the option to terminate.  
While many counterparties were slow to terminate in Lehman, the 
Metavante decision
116 and the threat of being late to a collateral-selling 
party will provide stronger incentives for early termination in the 
future.
117  Once the integrity of a derivative portfolio has been breached, 
the debtor must balance it, either by liquidating other positions, or by 
reentering the missing trades, likely at a much higher cost.  Partial 
liquidation of a portfolio, therefore, will likely lead to the liquidation of 
larger portions of the portfolio, if not the whole thing.  The OLA 
contains a stay on ipso-facto clauses, but it does not have anything that 
would allow it to assume a contract that had already been terminated and 
closed-out.  The presence of the liquidation-tending derivative safe 
harbors in the Bankruptcy Code interferes with any ability the OLA 
would have to cooperate with or use the Bankruptcy Code as a first line 
of defense. 
The OLA decisionmakers would be forced to make an important 
decision about intervention before the bankruptcy filing in order to retain 
the option to preserve the portfolio.  It might seem like a small matter, 
perhaps only a matter of days, but in actuality it creates a significant 
amount of cost and unnecessary pressures that threaten to undermine the 
effectiveness of OLA decisionmaking.  First, this timing combines two 
questions that are better made separately, and in the other order.  The 
policymaker’s concern is about systemic risk, not about the resolution of 
the debtor.  However, in order for the debtor to make the decision about 
whether to go into bankruptcy or not, they must first decide whether 
there is systemic risk. In addition, combination of those questions puts 
the decision about when the company is in financial distress in the hands 
of the person least able to evaluate it, the distant policymaker,
118 and 
involves the debtor’s management in decisions about systemic risk, while 
distorting the management’s incentives.  Third, combining these 
questions may artificially hurry the decision making and degrade the 
information available for it.
119  Finally, deciding whether to intervene 
before a company has filed for bankruptcy may force OLA 
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decisionmakers to make a politically charged decision in a less politically 
hospitable environment, creating the potential for less resolute action and 
unhelpful political reactions. 
a. The Safe Harbors enlarge the question that must be decided. 
The decision to intervene actually involves two separate 
decisions, with different informational inputs.  First there is the decision 
that a firm is in financial distress. The second decision is whether the 
financial distress is likely to involve systemic risk.  These are very 
different questions: one involves intimate knowledge of the inner 
workings of a business, the other involves detailed knowledge about 
where a business fits into the economy and the likely impact of its failure 
on others.  Forcing the OLA to decide whether to intervene early forces 
them to bundle these decisions together, which is a much larger decision 
to make with very different informational inputs. 
b. Combining questions complicates an already-complex decisionmaking 
process. 
The Dodd-Frank already requires complicated cooperation between 
financial regulators for intervention.
120  Decisions to resolve a company 
before bankruptcy, however, also require detailed information about the 
inner workings and financial statuses of financial firms, which only 
comes from management.  Panicked managers during the financial crisis 
wanted nothing better than to cooperate with the government.  But the 
incentives created by the current system may not always be so aligned. 
The current system offers a no-win choice for managers of distressed 
financial institutions.  Bankruptcy leads to disorderly liquidations, 
unemployment, and disgrace.  Dodd-Frank contains punitive 
requirements for management. Faced with an unattractive options, 
managers may delay in hopes the markets will turn around, or possibly 
face higher incentives to cover up mistakes and bad results.  This 
incentive to delay could render management less proactive in preparing 
for financial distress and less interested in cooperating with the FDIC.   
OLA decisionmakers have limited options to correct this weakness.  
Political realities would deter the OLA decision makers from intervening 
at a firm whose management did not welcome it.  Any weakening of the 
harsh OLA treatment for management could create serious moral hazard 
problems. Enforcing the wind-down planning requirement will be 
difficult in the face of management indifference.    
As long as an orderly reorganization is not possible for 
management of large financial firms under bankruptcy---and the safe 
harbors likely prevent it for many firms---management will have little 
incentive to prepare for resolution proactively.  Forcing a premature 
intervention decision requires the OLA decisionmakers to be subject to 
these weaknesses.  A bankruptcy system that presented a viable 
resolution scheme for mid-to-large financial institutions might entice 
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managers to prepare more actively in order to retain control over their 
firm.  
c. Early decisionmaking may degrade available information. 
Premature decisions about intervention may artificially limit the 
information available to assess whether and when to intervene. As we 
have seen, early decision making involves combining the decisions when 
or if to take over the firm and the decision whether there is systemic risk. 
In a different world, the best information about the first question would 
come from watching the actions of a management team motivated to 
prepare for and use bankruptcy proactively.  Management knows better 
when a firm is in distress and how it should be prepared.  Yet, the 
necessity to intervene early means that the OLA decision makers cannot 
simply wait and make a final decision about intervention after 
management files for bankruptcy, because that would might cost them 
their option to preserve the portfolio. Moreover, the value of 
management cooperation may be limited because of management’s 
strong incentive to delay.  Thus, combining the two questions may 
impair information about when a firm is in distress and should be 
resolved. 
In addition, combining the questions may also hinder the decision 
about systemic risk. OLA decisionmakers will not be able to wait and 
assess how the markets react to the news of the firm’s bankruptcy.  
Markets are often considered valuable aggregators of collective 
information, the collective assessment of market participants.  In difficult 
cases, the reaction of the financial markets to a bankruptcy might provide 
objective data to support the case to intervene, or at least be useful in 
politically justifying the action. If the OLA must decide whether to 
intervene early, though, this information will not be available. 
d. Early decisionmaking increases the political costs of intervention. 
In addition, the decision to intervene before bankruptcy may 
involve more political costs than intervening afterwards.  Pre-bankruptcy 
interventions mean that the OLA decisionmakers must announce both 
that a problem exists and that they are going to solve it.  The role of the 
messenger of bad news is a less politically desirable role than the role of 
the person who responds positively to a publicly recognized disaster.  In 
addition, the OLA decisionmakers might be able to use market reactions 
to the bankruptcy to help justify their intervention.  Splitting the decision 
for the company to file bankruptcy from the decision for the OLA to 
intervene would place the OLA decisionmakers in a stronger political 
position to act firmly and with good judgment. 
* * * 
  In summary, the retention of the safe harbors in bankruptcy 
would likely create numerous costs and external distortions in the OLA 
intervention decisionmaking stemming from the necessity to make the 
decision whether to intervene or not before the firm filed for bankruptcy.  
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significantly more information.  The information needs require the OLA 
decisionmakers to work closely with management, whose incentives 
differ.  The decision must be made before the best information about 
systemic risk is available.  Finally, early intervention decisions might 
generate more negative political responses than a decision to intervene 
after the public announcement of a bankruptcy.  If these distortive forces 
were not enough, however, the safe harbors also heighten the costs of 
error in deciding not to intervene.  
2. Safe Harbors Increase the Cost of Being Wrong 
  Inaccurate OLA decisions could be failure to intervene when 
warranted (underintervention), or intervention when not warranted 
(overintervention).  The cost of making an error in a decision (over or 
under intervention) influences the decision making.  If a decision one 
way would have higher error costs while a decision the other way would 
have lower error costs, decisionmakers may mitigate difficult-to-make 
decisions by leaning towards the answer that has less error cost.  The safe 
harbors in bankruptcy change the calculus for OLA decisionmakers by 
increasing the costs of underintervention, and possibly increasing the 
likelihood of also-costly over-intervention. 
a. OLA Over-intervention 
Systematic overintervention transforms the OLA from a system 
that handles systemic risk into a system that handles large financial 
failures of all kinds.  This transformation from a circumstance-focus to 
an entity-focus over-enlarges the OLA and presents significant potential 
costs on the system.  OLA activation involves significant political costs 
(the appearance of “bail-out”)
121 and also involves high bureaucratic 
costs that have few economies of scale.  To patrol more entities, the 
FDIC would need to hire more people.  They have even discussed 
keeping people at all possible resolution targets around the year to dispel 
the risk of signaling weakness by bringing people in on the ground 
during a crisis.
122  Moreover, the requirement that the FDIC terminate 
current management means that they will either have to hire a 
restructuring firm like Alvarez & Marsal who managed the Lehman 
bankruptcy, or have the people on staff to manage it.  Both of those costs 
scale directly with OLA activity.   
Those are small potatoes, though, compared to their authority to 
draw on the Federal Reserve to fund the distressed firm.  In theory, the 
assets of the distressed firm secure the loan, and any shortfall is made up 
through a fee on the industry.  Both of those are costly, however.  The 
collateral would have gone to unsecured creditors, otherwise, and 
shortfalls at multiple firms could lead to sizeable fees on the industry. In 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
121 See NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 3 at 138–39 (“Bank regulators are 
likely to postpone resolution if they can…After all, taking over would mean 
selling or dismembering a complicated financial institution.  Even a Treasury 
secretary who is less of a bailout enthusiast than Timothy Geithner will want to 
put off the day of reckoning, and it seems unlikely that the Fed or FDIC will be 
more anxious to invoke the regime.”). 
122 See FDIC, supra note 74 at 11. Derivative	 ﾠSafe	 ﾠHarbors	 ﾠin	 ﾠBankruptcy	 ﾠand	 ﾠDodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
addition, overintervention creates the expectation of intervention.  One 
reason the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy was so large was that the 
market expected the government to bail them out to the very last day.  
Overintervention loads a bankruptcy filing with significant information 
about government policy: the OLA chose not to intervene.  Markets will 
react more strongly against mid-to-large size financial bankruptcies, even 
if there is no systemic risk.  None of this is a surprise and the costs of 
overintervention are not directly driven by the safe harbors. Given the 
sizeable costs in activating the OLA unnecessarily, however, OLA 
decisionmakers might prefer to err on the side of underintervention, or at 
least retain the option to wait and see.  The safe harbors raise the costs of 
that alternative and thus make overintervention more attractive in 
uncertain cases. 
b. Underintervention 
The legislators who wrote Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
foresaw the possibility that the OLA decisionmakers might prefer to take 
a wait-and-see approach, even after a large financial bankruptcy.
123  This 
naturally attractive option, however, is much less attractive with the 
current bankruptcy safe harbors.  If the OLA declined to intervene before 
bankruptcy, the firm’s counterparties have incentives to terminate their 
transactions immediately and closeout.  Title II’s authority to pull a firm 
out of bankruptcy does not include the authority to override prior 
terminations.  Terminations of any size degrade the salability of a 
derivative portfolio even if it was balanced before filing bankruptcy 
because buyers will need to do time-consuming due diligence to 
understand the current exposures. Therefore, any intervention after a 
termination will already have lost much ground.   
In addition, if the consequential mass terminations caused 
serious price movements in repo collateral or the derivatives market that 
exacerbated underlying weaknesses, say, the OLA could not do anything 
about it at that point.  Their one point of intervention would be before the 
bankruptcy filing allowed the derivatives to be terminated.  Thus, a crisis 
of a mid-sized derivative party at the beginning of a crisis, before the 
potential depth of it was realized, could cause the crisis to develop and 
deepen more quickly. 
In addition, since derivatives play such a critical role in firm risk 
management for financial firms, the mass-termination of derivatives in 
the wake of a financial filing could force or hurry the liquidation of 
critical market player.  Effective risk management is essential to most 
large financial institutions.  If large portions of their derivatives were 
terminated, the firm would likely have to sell other assets in order to 
lower their risk profile.  If the market was not able to absorb the sudden 
loss of capacity from that liquidation, price dislocations and market 
disruption could also occur.  
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Finally, the largest risk of underintervention is misreading the 
expectations of the market.  Arguably, the greatest contribution the 
Lehman bankruptcy made to the Financial Crisis was the government’s 
failure to meet the market’s expectation of a bailout.
124  The road back to 
confidence was very long and very costly. 
Even mild limits on the bankruptcy safe harbors could mitigate 
the risks of underintervention.  A three-day stay, as has been suggested 
elsewhere,
125 could present the OLA decision makers with the option of 
allowing a firm on the margins of significance to file for bankruptcy, 
giving them more time to evaluable whether intervention was necessary.  
The risk of underintervention would be mitigated because the OLA 
would have the option of intervening later, which would allow them to 
make better decisions about when intervention was justified. 
* * * 
The bankruptcy safe harbors force the OLA decisionmakers to 
bundle the decision to intervene together with the decision of whether the 
company should file for bankruptcy.  This bundling is unnecessary and 
fails to place each decision with the most competent decisionmaker. If 
bankruptcy had a short stay on ipso facto clauses, however, the OLA 
decisionmakers could use that time to consider whether the failure of that 
party really would have systemic effects. Then, if they needed to act, 
they could act and they would have a better position to do so. However, 
while bankruptcy allows the willy-nilly termination of all swaps, 
allowing a preliminary bankruptcy simply will not be possible if the 
OLA decision-makers want the option to preserve the portfolio. 
  The original justification for the derivative safe harbors was the 
risk of cascading failures in the event of the bankruptcy of a large 
financial institution.  The OLA was designed to deal with that situation.  
Now, however, the derivative safe harbors, rather than helping to restrain 
systemic risk, if they ever did, artificially distort and pressure the 
decisionmaking of the very tool that will handle systemic risk situations 
and hinder the ability of the Bankruptcy Code to play its helpful role as 
the default system of financial distress rules.   
The OLA creates the opportunity for the Bankruptcy Code to 
expand and follow its basic principles more fully because it now has a 
safety net.  The Bankruptcy Code has little at risk by attempting some 
better way to handle the dissolution of a financial nonbank, and much to 
gain.  The OLA’s statutory mandate to resolve financial distress in times 
of systemic risk does not mean that it must be the first line of defense or 
the only one.  The OLA frees the Bankruptcy Code up to experiment in 
the area of derivatives outside the shadow of a systemic crisis.  By 
making some basic changes, the Bankruptcy Code could enhance the 
efficiency of the OLA’s resolution of systemic risk and also take back its 
title as the default system for handling distress.  It also could better 
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follow its own purpose, the efficient redistribution of assets to their 
highest use.  The OLA need not be a vote of no-confidence in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Rather, it could be just what the Bankruptcy Code 
needs to take back its basic territory. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to popular perception, the inclusion in Dodd-Frank of a 
non-bankruptcy resolution authority need not be viewed as either a fatal 
judgment about bankruptcy’s inability to handle systemic risk or the final 
word to critics’ concerns about the derivative safe harbors in bankruptcy.  
It can be viewed as a helping hand, a challenge to practitioners and 
legislators to take this opportunity to develop a better rule-based way to 
handle systemically risky financial distress and to minimize the need for 
expensive and problematic ad hoc interventions.  Dodd-Frank’s Orderly 
Liquidation Authority weakens the justification for the exhaustive 
breadth of the bankruptcy derivative safe harbors while adding new 
structural reasons for limiting the safe harbors.   
Financial regulation is sometimes modeled as a sine wave: 
financial crises are followed by overregulation that eventually causes a 
backlash leading to underregulation and another crisis.
126  Recognizing 
this chance to soberly and thoughtfully improve our rule-based control of 
systemic risk could help limit the impact of our short memories and help 
us continue to move toward a stable, reliable, and fair financial system.   
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126 See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, Cardozo Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 329 (2011) (discussing the “oft-noted ‘sine curve of 
regulatory activity’”). 